董事高管责任保险会影响真实盈余管理吗?——基于超额在职消费的中介作用

Does Directors’Liability Insurance Affect Real Earnings Management?——Based on the Intermediary Role of Excessive On-the-job Consumption

从管理层治理视角出发,将董事高管责任保险(董责险)、超额在职消费和真实盈余管理纳入一个统一的研究框架内,以2007-2020年A股上市公司为样本,实证检验董责险对真实盈余管理的影响以及超额在职消费在两者关系中的中介作用。研究发现:董责险对真实盈余管理存在着显著的正向影响;超额在职消费在董责险与真实盈余管理之间起到部分中介效应;进一步异质性分析发现,在非国有以及两职合一的企业中,董责险对真实盈余管理的加剧效应更为明显。

From the perspective of Management Governance,this paper puts directors'liability insurance,excess on-the-job consumption and real earnings management into a unified research framework,taking a-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as samples,this paper empirically examines the impact of directors'liability insurance on real earnings management and the mediating role of excess on-the-job consumption in the relationship between the two.The findings are as follows:Firstly,directors'liability insurance has a significant positive impact on real earnings management.Secondly,excess on-the-job consumption plays a part of the intermediary effect between directors'liability insurance and real earnings management.Lastly,further heterogeneity analysis finds that,in the non-state-owned enterprises and the combination of the two functions,the aggravation effect of the real earnings management is more obvious.