交易属性与纵向组织形式选择

Trading Attributes and Vertical Organization Balance Selection

交易费用理论关于交易属性与组织形式关系的现有研究,忽视互惠激励及分工收益,未能把边际交易费用与边际分工收益的变化性质差异体现在其中;资产专用性、交易频率、交易风险三种属性与组织选择关系的研究缺乏一个一般理论模型;交易属性度量指标在一致性、易得性等方面尚不令人满意。基于交易费用理论基本原理及在此基础上新发展的组织静态均衡模型和组织均衡变动模型,提出在纵向分工协作中三种主要交易属性决定不同组织形式的互惠激励水平和差异对齐难度、进而决定最优组织形式的新观点,新构建了一个交易属性与组织形式关系的一般理论模型。研究发现,第一,资产专用性、交易频率、不确定性等三种交易属性共同决定了分工收益曲线、交易费用曲线的位置和形状,进而决定了边际分工收益与边际交易费用相等处的、净收益最大的组织均衡点。第二,提出新的研究假设:资产专用性增强时,净收益减少,纵向一体化升高;资产专用性非很弱下交易频率增加时,净收益减少,纵向一体化升高;资产专用性不很弱,但偏弱时,不确定性增加使得净收益增加,纵向一体化降低;资产专用性不很弱但偏强时,不确定性增加使得净收益减少,纵向一体化升高。第三,基于上市企业年度财务报表的一组更优的交易属性指标被提出。第四,计量检验结果符合交易费用经济学现有研究假设,同时支持新的研究假设。建议在纵向分工协作组织设计及优化中,应仔细考察和权衡三种交易属性及其变化对互惠激励和差异对齐的综合及动态的影响。

The existing research on the relationship between transaction attributes and organizational forms in transaction cost theory ignores reciprocity and incentives and division of labor income,and fails to reflect the difference in the changing nature of marginal transaction costs and marginal division of labor income.The research on the relationship between asset specificity,transaction frequency and transaction risk and organizational choice lacks a general theoretical model.The metrics of transaction attributes are not satisfactory in terms of consistency and availability.Based on the basic principle of transaction cost theory and the newly developed static equilibrium model and the equilibrium change model of organization,this paper put forward a new viewpoint that three main transaction attributes in vertical division of labor and cooperation determine the reciprocity and incentive level and the difficulty of difference alignment of organizational forms,and then determine the optimal organizational form.This paper also constructed a new general theoretical model of the relationship between transaction attributes and organizational forms.It was found that,firstly,asset specificity,transaction frequency,uncertainty and other three transaction attributes jointly determine the position and shape of the profit curve and the transaction cost curve of division of labor,and then they determine the organizational equilibrium point where the marginal division of labor income is equal to the marginal transaction cost with the net income as the largest.Secondly,a new research hypothesis was put forward:When asset specificity increases,net income decreases and vertical integration increases;when the transaction frequency increases and the asset specificity is not very weak,the net income decreases and the vertical integration increases;when asset specificity is weak,the increase of uncertainty leads to the increase of net income and the decrease of vertical integration;when asset specificity is strong,the increase of uncertainty leads to the decrease of net income and the increase of vertical integration.Thirdly,a set of better transaction attribute indicators based on the annual financial statements of listed companies was put forward.Fourthly,the econometric test results were in line with the existing research hypothesis of transaction cost economics and supporting the new research hypothesis.It is suggested that in the design and optimization of vertical division of labor and cooperation organization,the comprehensive and dynamic effects of three transaction attributes and their changes on reciprocity and incentives and differential alignment should be examined and considered.