中国式邻避困境中多元利益冲突与纾解

Research on Multiple Interest Conflicts and Relief in Chincsc-style NIMBY Dilemma

多元利益主体间的非均衡博弈是引起中国式邻避困境的主要根源。在邻避效应发生发展的不同阶段,以地方政府、相关企业、周边公众和社会群体为代表的不同利益群体间相互博弈,形成多重利益冲突和“囚徒困境”。因此,诠释多元利益主体的价值偏好和利益诉求,并剖析多元利益主体博弈行为逻辑演变机理,通过完善利益共识机制、利益表达机制、利益补偿机制的路径,实现“不合作博弈”向“合作博弈”转变,利于有效化解邻避困境,推进社会基层治理现代化。

The non-equilibrium game among multiple stakeholders is the main source of the Chinese-style NIMBY dilemma.At different stages of the development of the NIMBY effect,different interest groups represented by local governments,related enterprises,surrounding public and social groups compete with each other to form multiple conflicts of interest and the“prisoner’s dilemma”.Therefore,it interprets the value preferences and interest demands of multiple stakeholders,and analyzes the logic evolution mechanism of the game behavior of multiple stakeholders.The transformation of“game”is conducive to effectively resolving the dilemma of NIMBY and promoting the modernization of social grassroots governance.