幸福论而非德性论:论亚里士多德伦理学的旨趣与结构

Eudaimonism Ethics Rather than Virtue Ethics:The Purport and Structure of Aristotle’s Ethics

德性伦理学或美德伦理学并不足以完整地描述亚里士多德的伦理学。幸福既是亚里士多德伦理学的理论旨趣,又是其伦理学理论结构中最为核心的概念。亚里士多德的整个实践哲学都是围绕幸福是什么,以及如何获得幸福来展开的。德性虽然对于幸福的实现不可或缺,但是它并不等同于幸福。德性在亚里士多德的实践哲学中的地位是由他对幸福的独特理解所赋予的。因此,在这个意义上,我们应该遵循古代幸福主义伦理学的传统,重新完整地将亚里士多德的伦理学描述为幸福主义的伦理学,而不是仅仅将其定位为当代美德伦理学在古代的典范。

Virtue ethics is not fully enough to describe Aristotle’s ethics, of which eudaimonia is not only the theoretical purport in his ethics but also the core concept in its theoretical structure. Aristotle’s entire philosophy of praxis revolves around what eudaimonia is and how to achieve it. Virtue is indispensable to the realization of eudaimonia, but it is not eudaimonia. The position of virtue in Aristotle’s philosophy of praxis is acquired through his unique understanding of eudaimonia. Thus, in this sense, it is supposed to follow the ancient tradition of eudaimonism ethics and describe the whole Aristotle’s ethics as the ethics of eudaimonism rather than the paragon of contemporary virtue ethics in the ancient.