摘要
文章着眼于基金公司的委托—代理问题,选取2012—2021年中国发起式基金的季度数据,研究基金管理人持基对基金业绩的影响。实证结果表明:基金管理人持基比例或持基金额的提高能够有效激励基金经理提高努力程度,获得更好的基金业绩,而且不会提高基金风险水平。文章以中国发起式基金为自然实验,基于政策外生性有效解决了现有文献难以规避的内生性问题,检验结果更具说服力。与此同时,发起式基金作为中国证监会推出的创新型基金产品,但鲜有文献对其进行深入研究。文章首次对发起式基金的基金管理人持基问题进行了讨论分析,对监管层完善法律法规、基金公司设计激励机制以及基金投资人选择基金标的都具有重要的参考意义。
Focusing on the principal-agent problem of fund companies,the paper study the impact of managerial ownership on fund performance,using quarterly data of Chinese sponsored funds from 2012 to 2021.The empirical results show that:The increase of fund managers'holding ratio can effectively motivate fund managers to improve their efforts and obtain better fund performance,while not increasing fund risk.This paper uses the natural experiment of Chinese sponsored funds,which can effectively address the endogeneity problem that is difficult to be circumvented by existing studies with the help of policy externality,making the results more persuasive.Meanwhile,as new products launched by Chinese SEC,but few literatures have conducted in-depth research on it.This paper innovatively studies the managerial ownership problems of sponsored funds,making contributions to regulators improving laws and regulations,fund companies designing incentive mechanisms,and fund investors choosing funds.
作者
刘晶
沈桂龙
李祥文
LIU Jing;SHEN Gui-long;LI Xiang-wen(Economic Research Institute,Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences,Shanghai 200020,China;International Chinese Research Institute,Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences,Shanghai 200020,China;Private Banking Department,Bank of Communications,Shanghai 200120,China)
出处
《技术经济与管理研究》
北大核心
2023年第3期77-83,共7页
Journal of Technical Economics & Management
