机构投资者实地调研如何影响公司非效率投资——基于代理冲突和信息不对称的机制检验

How Does Investors'Corporate Site Visits Influence Inefficient Investment:Based on Agency Conflict and Information Asymmetry

基于委托代理理论的分析框架,信息不对称及代理冲突是影响公司投资效率的重要因素。实地调研作为上市公司和投资者的沟通桥梁,能否增进双方之间的了解与信任,缓解代理冲突和降低信息不对称,进而抑制公司非效率投资,是本文旨在探究的核心问题。本文以中国A股非金融类上市公司为样本,实证考察机构投资者实地调研(以下简称机构实地调研)对公司非效率投资的影响,并进一步探究其内在影响机制。在利用极端天气比作为工具变量、采用两阶段最小二乘法缓解潜在的内生性问题后发现,机构实地调研与公司非效率投资显著负相关。机制检验发现,机构实地调研通过降低代理冲突和缓解信息不对称来抑制公司非效率投资,以上结论在采用双重差分法、考虑样本自选择和变换核心变量度量方式后依然成立。进一步分析发现,代理冲突和信息不对称不具有长期中介效应,代理冲突和信息不对称的机制作用受到公司内部治理环境的调节,代理冲突的中介效应随着公司信息环境的改善而减弱。本文细致刻画了机构实地调研对公司非效率投资的具体作用机制,为正确理解机构实地调研的公司治理效应提供了新的理论诠释,为监管部门继续推出和完善上市公司投资者关系管理和相关披露政策提供了有力的经验证据。

How to strengthen communication and trust with investors has always been a difficult problem for firm,and it is also an effective way for investors to form a fair understanding of firm value and investment strategy.So,Shenzhen Stock Exchange promulgated on firm to disclose investor relations management information.There is no consensus on whether the economic consequences of investor visits are positive or negative.Whether investors'corporate site visits play a positive role in corporate governance remains to be further tested and demonstrated.In traditional principal-agent theory,information asymmetry and agency conflict are the most common and important factors affecting the firm investment efficiency.As an important way for firm and investors to establish a two-way communication bridge,site visits can strengthen the communication and trust between firm and institutional investors,alleviate agency conflicts and reduce information asymmetry,thus affecting the firm investment efficiency? Based on the data of China's A-share non-financial listed companies from 2012 to 2017,this paper tries to examine whether investors'corporate site visits will improve the firm investment efficiency,and further explores the internal influence mechanism.This study found that investors'corporate site visits have a significant positive impact on the firm investment efficiency.The path test found that agency conflict and information asymmetry play a part of the mediating role in the relationship between investors'corporate site visits and firm investment efficiency,but the mediating effect of agency conflict is weakened with the improvement of company's information environment.After a series of robustness tests,the above conclusions are still valid.This article describes in more detail the specific mechanism of the investors'corporate site visits on firm investment efficiency,and provides theoretical support for understanding the corporate governance effects of investors'corporate site visits.The conclusion of this paper also provides strong empirical evidence for China Securities Regulatory Commission to continue to promote and improve the investor access information disclosure policy.This paper may have the following three contributions:(1)this paper clarifies the internal logical relationship and transmission mechanism between investors'corporate site visits and firm investment efficiency,and effectively complements the literature research on the microeconomic consequences of investors'corporate site visits.(2)this paper enriches and expands the research on the mechanism of investors'corporate site visits affecting firm inefficient investment.(3)we take extreme weather as an exogenous tool variable for investors'corporate site visits,and use 2SLS,DID,Heckman two-step,PSM and three-stage method to overcome potential endogeneity problems,which provides ideas for future related research on how to comprehensively alleviate endogeneity problems.