企业金融资产的配置动机:基于产权性质与异质性股东参股的分析

Research on the Motivation for Financial Asset Allocation: Analysis Based on the Nature of Property Rights and the Reform of Mixed-ownership

本文以企业金融资产配置动机的争论为切入点,采用2007—2018年沪深两市A股上市公司年度数据,考察了不同产权性质下异质性股东参股对企业金融化的影响。研究发现,民营股东参股降低了国有企业金融化,并且在代理成本高的样本组中更为显著。国有股东参股提高了民营企业金融化,并且在融资约束低的样本组中更显著。这说明,国有企业金融化表现为“替代性动机”,民营企业金融化表现为“预防性动机”。进一步研究发现,国有股东参股民营企业主要提高了企业的短期金融资产配置水平,而民营股东参股国有企业主要降低了企业的长期金融资产配置水平。同时,异质性股东参股引发的金融资产配置水平变化有利于企业价值的提升。本文研究不仅有利于正确理解实体经济与虚拟经济之间的关系,也为引导实体经济“脱虚向实”提供了政策启示。

The possible adverse effects of the financialization of enterprises have received a lot of attention from the government and academia. However,in order to find appropriate reform policies to restrain the financialization of enterprises and to prevent the economic risk of funds being diverted out of the real economy,we must first clarify the motivation for the financialization of enterprises. This is the basis for policy practice optimization and theoretical innovation.There are two main views on the motivation for the financialization of enterprises. The first one is precautionary motivation based on the resource dependence theory. The second one is alternative motivation based on the principal-agent theory. The main difference between the two views is that the former emphasizes the precautionary reserve of enterprises under the resource dependence theory,while the latter reiterates the profit-seeking nature of managers and major shareholders under the principalagent framework. The differences in academic views indicate that the motivation for the financialization of enterprises may vary greatly in different institutional environments,which cannot be concluded simply by one point of view. China is the largest transitional economy in the world,and its dual ownership structure rooted in the economic system provides a good institutional carrier for the study of this paper.Based on the annual data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2018,this paper investigates the impact of heterogeneous shareholders’ equity participation on the financialization of enterprises under different types of property rights. The study finds that private shareholders’ equity participation reduces the financialization of state-owned enterprises,and it is more significant in the sample group with high agency costs. The equity participation of state-owned shareholders improves the financialization of private enterprises,and it is more significant in the sample group with low financing constraints. This shows that the financialization of state-owned enterprises is characterized by alternative motivation and the financialization of private enterprises is characterized by precautionary motivation. Further study shows that state-owned shareholders’ equity participation in private enterprises mainly improves the short-term financial assets of the enterprises,while private shareholders’ equity participation in state-owned enterprises mainly reduces the long-term financial assets of the enterprises. At the same time,the change in the financial asset allocation level caused by heterogeneous shareholders’ equity participation is conducive to the promotion of enterprise value.In terms of theoretical significance, by observing the differentiated effects of heterogeneous shareholders’ equity participation on financial asset allocation under different types of property rights,this paper provides a new explanation for the motivation for the financialization of Chinese enterprises.Precautionary motivation and alternative motivation have always been the focus of the debate on the motivation for the financialization of enterprises,and existing research has not given a definitive answer.The governance effect and the resource effect of heterogeneous shareholders’ equity participation provide a good experimental scenario for resolving this debate. This study shows that the financialization of stateowned enterprises is based on alternative motivation,while the financialization of private enterprises is based on precautionary motivation.In terms of policy implications,first of all,the policymakers should correctly understand the relationship between the virtual economy and the real economy in enterprise economic activities.Secondly,the policymakers should correctly guide the investment fields of enterprises and strive for the coordinated development of the real economy and the virtual economy. Finally, in view of the phenomenon of funds being diverted out of the real economy,the policymakers should strengthen supervision,but the policy of uniformity is not feasible.