农村基层选举中的宗族博弈与社区治理——基于全国村庄抽样调查数据的量化分析

Exploring the Relationship between Clan Games,Community Governance,and Grassroots Elections in Rural China:A Quantitative Analysis Based on a Nationwide Village Survey

基于全国村庄调查数据,采用考虑构成性成分的回归模型,本研究对影响农村基层选举中大姓当选的多重制度逻辑进行了研究。结果发现,大姓当选背后存在村庄宗族之间结构性的内生博弈关系;村务监督、民主协商等制度性设置降低了村委会主任在宗族方面的集中度,某些村庄特征也产生一定影响。另外,多村合并虽然整体降低了第一大姓当选的概率,但同时也在多个方面令村庄政治复杂化。这些发现具有一定理论和现实意义。在当前加强党建引领、构筑现代化治理体系、实现农村善治的总体部署下,推进民主协商、加强村务监督等制度建设,是农村基层克服传统宗族主义倾向、促进社区治理现代化的重要保证。

This study examines the institutional dynamics that shape powerful clan election results in rural grassroots elections by employing a nationwide sample survey of villages and a regression model that considers the compositional information of each village's first four major clans.Results indicate that a structural endogenous game between large clans has a complex impact on election outcomes.Meanwhile,institutional settings such as village supervision and democratic consultation have lowered the probability of large clan members serving as village committee directors,and specific village characteristics have been found to be influential.In addition,the practice of village combination lessens the chance of the most popular clan being elected;however,it has complicated village politics in many ways.These findings have both theoretical and practical implications.It is essential to develop democratic consultation,village supervision,and other community governance institutions to counter clannish behavior and promote governance modernization under the overall deployment of reinforcing the leadership of party building,modernizing the governance system,and achieving good rural governance.