基于链与链竞争的零售端物流供应链协调策略研究

Coordination Strategies of Retail Logistics Supply Chain Based on Chain-to-chain Competition

在零售与物流深度融合的背景下,市场竞争已经逐渐演变成供应链之间的竞争,为探索链与链之间竞争的协调策略与决策机制,构建了供应链成员在协调、非协调和混合情景下的博弈模型,并求解供应链成员的均衡决策和供应链成员利润的差异,且将模型扩展到考虑多条链竞争情形。研究发现:协调策略是竞争供应链双方的占优策略,先采用协调策略一方可获得更高市场份额;且当市场需求敏感系数较低时,博弈均衡下的占优策略使双方陷入“囚徒困境”,供应链成员的利润互损,而市场客户受益。仅当市场需求敏感系数较高时,协调策略使竞争双方获得需求扩张的补偿,才可达成“双赢”;在增加竞争供应链数量之后,竞争强度的增大有利于协调双方摆脱“囚徒困境”。

Under the background of supply chain competition with deep integration of retail and logistics,market competition has evolved into competition between supply chains.In order to explore the coordination strategy and decision-making mechanism of competition between supply chains,we construct the game models under the coordinated,uncoordinated and mixed scenarios,and solves the equilibrium decisions of supply chain members.On this basis,the effects of coordination strategies on the profits of supply chain members under these three game structures are compared and analyzed.Finally,the models are extended to consider the competition of multiple chains,and the influence of market competition intensity on the decisions and profits of supply chain members are studied.It is found that the coordination strategy is always the dominant strategy of both sides of the competition,and the party who first adopts the coordination strategy can gain a higher market share;when the market demand sensitivity coefficient is low,the dominant strategy under the game equilibrium makes the two sides of the competition fall into the“prisoner’s dilemma”,the profits of the supply chain members are mutually damaged and the market customers benefit.Only when the market demand sensitivity coefficient is high,the coordination strategy can make both sides of the competition obtain the compensation of demand expansion,and then a“win-win”can be achieved.After increasing the number of competitive supply chains,the increasing intensity of competition is conducive to coordinating the two sides to get rid of the“prisoner’s dilemma”.The results of numerical analysis verify the feasibility of the proposed models and the theoretical analysis.