摘要
建立一个资金约束的制造商同时通过在线渠道和传统渠道销售产品的双渠道模型,引入传统渠道的零售商公平关切行为,探讨制造商的融资策略选择。研究表明:决策变量和制造商的最优融资策略依赖于公平关切参数;竞争强度增强会导致制造商的批发价格、直销价格和零售商的零售价格上涨;融资方提高贷款利率会导致制造商的批发价格和直销价格上涨,并且制造商在融资情况下的直销价格和批发价格均大于无需融资情况下的直销价格和批发价格;制造商在公平关切参数较低时选择第三方平台融资更好,在公平关切参数较高时可能会选择银行融资。
This study establishes a dual-channel model in which the manufacturer with capital constraint sells products through both online and traditional channels,introducing fairness concern of the retailer in traditional channels,and discusses manufacturer’s financing strategy choice.The results show that decision variables and manufacturer’s optimal financing strategies depend on fairness concern parameter.The intensification of competition leads to a higher manufacturer’s wholesale price,a higher direct sales price as well as a higher retailer’s direct retail price.When the financing party increases the loan interest rate,the manufacturer’s wholesale price and direct sales price will increase,and the both price with financing are higher than those without financing.It is better for the manufacturer to choose third-party platform financing when the fairness concern parameter is low;while the manufacturer may adopt bank financing when the fairness concern parameter is high.
作者
杨丽芳
周永务
曹彬
YANG Lifang;ZHOU Yongwu;CAO Bin(Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing,China;South China University of Technology,Guangzhou,China;Jinan University,Guangzhou,China)
出处
《管理学报》
北大核心
2023年第3期440-451,共12页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071082,71520107001)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(19YJC630003)。
关键词
资金约束
公平关切
融资策略
第三方平台
capital constraint
fairness concern
financing strategy
third-party platform