供应链赊销下有破产影响的收入共享契约

Revenue Sharing Contracts Considering the Impact of Bankruptcy under Trade Credit in a Supply Chain

为探讨赊销下破产成本对供应链契约设计和协调的影响,构建考虑破产成本的收入共享-赊销契约。针对不同的破产成本区间得出协调条件,并分析破产成本、自有资金和质押物对契约设计的影响。研究表明:破产成本低于某临界值时,使转移价格提升,供应链协调条件更苛刻,且会加剧自有资金和质押物对转移价格的影响,供应商通过更多的降价激励销售商增加自有资金和质押物;破产成本高于某临界值时,不影响转移价格,也不影响自有资金和质押物对转移价格的作用,并存在少数契约参数使得供应链协调,赊销不再促使供应链协调。

In order to explore the impact of the bankruptcy cost on supply chain contract design and coordination under trade credit,this study constructs revenue sharing-credit sales contracts that consider bankruptcy cost.For different bankruptcy cost ranges,the conditions for coordinating the supply chain are obtained,and the effects of the retailer’s bankruptcy cost,the level of working capital and the value of the pledge on the contract design are analyzed.The research shows that when the bankruptcy cost is lower than a certain critical value,(1)it makes transfer price higher and coordination conditions of supply chain more demanding.(2)The bankruptcy cost aggravates the impact of the level of working capital and the value of pledged goods on the transfer price,so that suppliers encourage retailers to increase working capital and pledges through greater price reduction.When the bankruptcy cost is higher than a certain critical value,(1)Bankruptcy cost no longer affects the setting of transfer price,nor does it affect the role of working capital and collateral on transfer price.(2)There are only a few contract parameters can make supply chain coordination,and trade credit no longer promote supply chain coordination.