社会信任对非金融企业影子银行化的影响研究

Social Trust and Non-Financial Enterprises’Shadow Banking Activities

将经理人薪酬动态激励契约机制纳入企业三期动态投融资决策模型,引入社会信任的声誉惩罚机制,利用2015~2019年非金融类上市公司数据,对社会信任与企业影子银行化之间的关系和影响机制进行实证分析。研究表明:(1)地区社会信任程度越高,企业从事影子银行业务的意愿越弱;(2)上述效应在公司治理较差、信息不透明程度较高、股权集中度较高、成长性较差的公司更为显著;(3)社会信任水平的提高能够通过抑制管理层机会主义行为、加剧风险交互传染效应和稳定外部投资者情绪渠道,作用于企业影子银行化行为。

This study incorporates the dynamic incentive contract mechanism of managerial compensation into the three-period dynamic investment and financing decision model of enterprises,introduces the reputation penalty mechanism of social trust,and conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship and influence mechanism between social trust and corporate shadow banking using data from non-financial listed companies from 2015~2019.The results show that:(i)The higher the degree of regional social trust,the weaker the willingness of firms to engage in shadow banking.(ii)The above effect is more significant in companies with poorer corporate governance,higher information opacity,higher equity concentration and poorer growth.(iii)An increase in the level of social trust can act on firms’shadow banking behavior by inhibiting management’s opportunistic behavior,exacerbating the risk cross-contagion effect and stabilizing the external investor sentiment channel.