基于演化博弈的中国绿色债券评级评估系统激励与约束机制研究

The Strategy Analysis on Optimization of Financial Incentives and Regulatory Constraints in China’s Green Bond Rating Market:Evolutionary Game Model Based on the Background of“Double Rating+Double Supervision”

引入政府财政激励与证监会监管约束条件,基于演化博弈理论构建绿色债券评级评估机制四位参与者的2*2策略互动支付矩阵,并运用数值仿真分析绿色债券评级评估系统下财政激励、监管约束政策减少评估“漂绿”与评级“虚高”情形的适用条件。研究表明:绿色债券发展初期,提升政府财政激励在一定条件下能够提高评估评级机构选择绿色债券公正评估评级的概率,但会增加监管成本;提升监管惩罚约束在一定条件下能够防范评级评估机构做出“漂绿”评估和“虚高”评级并降低监管成本;在财政激励一定时,提高监管惩罚约束中的不定期监督检查频率为绿色债券评级评估有效性带来的正向影响比加大监管惩罚力度更为显著。研究结论为监管者和政府选择合适的激励约束政策提供了管理建议。

Introduce government financial incentives and CSRC regulatory constraints,build a 2*2 strategy interactive payment matrix for four participants in the green bond rating and evaluation mechanism based on evolutionary game theory,and use numerical simulation to analyze the financial incentives and regulatory constraints under the green bond rating and evaluation system Policy to reduce the conditions for assessing“greenwashing”and inflated ratings.This paper shows that:in the early stage of green bond development,increasing government financial incentives can increase the probability that rating agencies choose green bond fair evaluation ratings under certain conditions,but also increase the cost of supervision;improving regulatory punishment constraints can prevent rating agencies under certain conditions.Make“greenwashing”assessments and inflated ratings and reduce regulatory costs when financial incentives are fixed,increasing the frequency of irregular supervision and inspection in regulatory punishment constraints has a greater positive impact on the effectiveness of green bond rating assessments than regulatory penalties.The conclusions provide management suggestions for regulators and governments to choose appropriate incentive and restraint policies.