考虑奖惩分配激励机制的环境污染第三方治理演化博弈

Introducing an incentive mechanism of reward and punishment distribution to the evolutionary game of the third-party governance of environmental pollution

为解决环境责任归属模糊背景下环境污染第三方治理中的信息不对称问题,本研究构建了排污企业、第三方治理企业和地方政府的三方演化博弈模型,探索激励政策体系对参与主体策略选择的作用机制,探讨了不同情形下系统实现演化稳定状态的基本条件,并在此基础上结合数值仿真验证了关于博弈系统和主体策略演化稳定性分析的科学性.研究发现:设置合理的奖惩金额与分配系数、提升双方企业的声誉收益以及控制地方政府的监督成本是影响三方主体策略选择的关键影响因素;依据“责任分担原则”设计的奖惩分配激励机制对于促进委托代理双方达成信任合作具有正面作用;排污企业较第三方治理企业表现出更强的收益敏感性.为此,需落实排污企业的污染主体责任地位,并尽可能提高其奖惩分配比例.

To solve the problem of information asymmetry in third-party governance of environmental pollution under the background of fuzzy attribution of environmental responsibility,the tripartite evolutionary game model of polluting enterprise,third-party governance enterprise and local government was constructed by introducing the mechanism of incentive policy system on the strategic choice of parties and assessing the basic conditions for the system to achieve evolutionary stable state in different situations.Then,the scientificity of the game subject and system evolution stability analysis is verified with numerical simulation.The study indicates that,setting a reasonable amount of rewards and punishments and their distribution ratio,enhancing the reputational benefits of both enterprises,and controlling the cost of local government supervision are the key factors that affect the strategies choice of the three-parties.The reward and punishment distribution incentive mechanism designed according to the“responsibility sharing principle”demonstrates its effectiveness in promoting the trust and cooperation between the principal and agent;and the polluting enterprise shows stronger income sensitivity than the third-party governance enterprise does.To this end,the main responsibility status of polluting enterprise needs to be implemented,and the proportion of rewards and punishments shall be increased as much as possible.