基于微分博奔的产业共性技术产学研合作研发契约研究

A Study of Industrial Generic Technology Industry-University-Research Cooperation R&D Contracts Based on Differential Game

根据产学研合作的紧密程度,将共性技术合作研发划分为半固定契约、非固定契约及一体化契约三种。运用微分博奔理论,本文探讨共性技术产学研合作研发契约选择及考虑政府支持策略的一体化契约实现问题。研究发现:半固定契约与非固定契约下,企业的商业开发努力水平相同,非固定契约下学研方的基础研究努力水平、技术知识量期望和方差及研发总利润较高;当产学研合作研发协同度足够大时,一体化契约为占优选择,提升产学研协同度是一体化契约实现的前提,而政府非补贴支持策略是提升协同度的重要切入点;产学研合作研发契约受到共性和个性两类因素影响,需区分不同影响因素及影响机理进行选择。

According to the closeness of industry-university-research cooperation,industrial generic technology cooperation R&D contract is divided into three types:semi-fixed contract,no-fixed contract and integrated contract.This paper uses stochastic differential game theory to discuss the selection of contract and the realization of integrated contract.The results of research show that the commercial development effort level is the same under the semi-fixed and non-fixed contracts,and the level of basic research effort,the expectation and variance of the amount of technical knowledge and the total profit under the non-fixed contract are higher than those under the semi-fixed contract.When the synergy degree of industry-university-research is large enough,the integrated contract is the best choice,which is guaranteed by the government's non-subsidy strategies.The selection of contract is affected by two types of factors:generic and individualized ones.It is necessary to distinguish the characteristics and mechanism of different influencing factors.