《民法典》实施背景下意定监护功能异化之矫正

Correction of the Intentional Guardianship Functional Alienation in the Context of Civil Code

我国民法将监护作为补足自然人行为能力之手段,导致监护被行为能力侵蚀和遮蔽,于功能上由关爱走向限制。法律剥夺被监护人进行民事行为的自我决定权,致使被监护人不得不托庇于监护人。《民法典》引入意定监护,本为克服法律整齐划一规定之不足。但由于与行为能力挂钩,意定监护困顿于监护人选择的狭窄视角,极大地减损了功能矫正力度。解开意定监护功能异化之结,需要找寻在不违背基本法理情况下将意定监护与行为能力脱钩的办法。通过目的解释,经由解释论路径重构行为能力与监护关系,使意定监护回归本人利益保护这一立法目的,系可行的路径。对《民法典》第28条和第33条作目的性限缩,将其限于自然人行为能力欠缺情况下监护的适用;而将行为能力非欠缺时的监护,视为一个立法未予规定之悬而未决的问题,通过运用民事法理和适用民法基本原则进行调整,系可行的方式。

The civil law of our country regards guardianship only as a means to supplement the behavioral ability of natural person,which causes guardianship to be affected and covered.The function of guardianship changes also from care to restriction.The law deprives the guardian users of the right of self-determination to carry out civil acts,so that they have to be restricted by the guardian.The introduction of intentional guardianship in the Civil Code is intended to overcome the disadvantages of unified provisions of the law.However,due to the link with behavioral ability,intentional guardianship is subject to the narrow perspective of guardians choice,which greatly reduces the role of functional correction.In order to solve the problem of alienation of intentional guardianship,it is necessary to find a way to decouple intentional guardianship from behavior ability without violating the basic legal principle.Through the purpose explanation in Articles 28 and 33 of the Civil Code,it is a feasible way to make the intentional guardianship return to the legislative purpose of personal interest protection.