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政府干预、消费者购买与农产品品牌建设——基于三方主体演化博弈的分析 被引量:9

Government Interference,Consumer Purchase Behavior and Brand Construction of Agricultural Products:Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory
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摘要 基于东北三省农产品品牌建设的调查情况,采用演化博弈方法,构建农产品生产组织、地方政府和消费者之间的三方演化博弈模型,分析三方主体策略选择和博弈系统均衡点的稳定性,并结合数值仿真方法考察不同初始意愿水平和不同参数取值对三方主体行为策略演化的影响。结果表明:中央政府给予地方政府参与品牌建设的奖励是影响其强干预策略选择的主要因素;(生产非品牌农产品,强干预,购买非品牌农产品)和(生产品牌农产品,强干预,购买品牌农产品)是演化稳定的策略组合,品牌农产品质量是模型演化稳定于(生产品牌农产品,强干预,购买品牌农产品)的关键;初始意愿和模型参数的不同取值会显著影响主体行为策略演化的方向和速度。据此,建议中央政府加大对采取强干预策略地方政府的奖励额度,地方政府“分阶段”“有重点”地推进农产品品牌建设,农产品生产组织坚持市场化导向,打造可替代性低、附加值高的农产品品牌。 Based on the investigation of the brand construction of agricultural products in the Northeast China,this paper uses the evolutionary game to build a tripartite evolutionary game model among agricultural production organizations,local government,and consumers,and discusses the stability of the three parties’strategy selections and the equilibrium points of the game system.Then,the influence of different initial willingness levels and different parameter values on the evolution of the three parties’behavior strategies is analyzed by using the numerical simulation method.The results show that the incentive given by the central government to local government is the main factor influencing local government in selecting strong intervention strategies.In the tripartite evolutionary game system,(producing non-brand agricultural products,strong intervention,and purchasing non-brand agricultural products)and(producing brand agricultural products,strong intervention,and purchasing brand agricultural products)are the possible evolutionary stable strategies,and the quality of brand agricultural products is the key of stabling the system to the latter point.The changes of the initial willingness and the parameters in the model will affect the evolution of other parties’behavioral strategies although the strength and direction of the influence vary in different situations.Therefore,it is suggested that the central government should increase the number of incentives for local governments to adopt the positive intervention strategies,that local government should promote the construction of agricultural product brands with “phased” and “focused” manners,and that agricultural production organizations should stick to the market-oriented orientation and build agricultural product brands with low substitutability and high added value.
作者 郭翔宇 姚江南 GUO Xiangyu;YAO Jiangnan(College of Economics and Management,Northeast Agricultural University,Harbin 150030,China)
出处 《农林经济管理学报》 北大核心 2023年第2期171-181,共11页 Journal of Agro-Forestry Economics and Management
基金 国家社会科学基金重大项目(21&ZD090) 黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划重点项目(21JYA442)。
关键词 农产品品牌建设 政府干预 品牌农产品消费 三方演化博弈 brand construction of agricultural products government interference consumption of brand agricultural products tripartite evolutionary game
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