基于演化博弈的全过程工程咨询项目合谋问题研究

Research on Collusion of Whole Process Engineering Consulting Project Based on Evolutionary Game

全过程工程咨询服务与工程总承包相结合的模式是项目管理快速发展的一种新趋势。运用博弈论的方法,构建业主全过程咨询企业总承包单位的三方演化博弈模型,基于业主监管的角度,对另外两方主体合谋问题进行研究。结果表明:全过程咨询企业和总承包单位合谋概率与业主监管力度,惩罚力度,声誉损失和各方主体初始意愿等因素相关性强;激励池规模与全咨企业策略选择相关性强,与总承包单位相关性弱。基于上述结果指出,在全过程工程咨询项目中,业主应针对全过程咨询企业和总承包单位采取不同管理措施,以降低合谋发生概率。

The combination of whole process engineering consulting service and general contracting is a new trend of the rapid development of project management.Using the method of game theory,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of owner,whole process consulting enterprise and general contracting unit,and studies the collusion of the other two parties based on the angle of owner supervision.The results show that the collusion probability of consulting enterprises and general contractors in the whole process has a strong correlation with the owner's supervision,punishment,reputation loss and the initial willingness of all parties;The scale of incentive pool has strong correlation with the strategic choice of general consulting enterprises,but weak correlation with general contracting units.Based on the above results,it is pointed out that in the whole process engineering consulting project,the owner should take different management measures for the whole process consulting enterprise and general contractor to reduce the probability of collusion.