摘要
大国治理和多层级政府的国情下,各级官员极易触达职业晋升的“天花板”。尤其在基层治理中,大多数官员更难以逾越“科级天花板”限制。那么基层政府如何激励大量“晋升无望”的官员呢?基于W县基层官员晋升路径的案例分析,发现“制造科层台阶”和“隐性微进步激励”起到重要作用,即科层组织会演化出除正式职务职级晋升之外的微小台阶式隐性晋升激励机制。具言之,这些隐性晋升激励机制根据权力纵向交互和横向影响的强弱可分为:发达地区任职、班子排名前提、靠近政治中心、风险规避减弱等。非正式制度在乡土中国基层治理中起到重要作用,本研究以生动案例呈现出制造科层台阶这种非正式晋升激励的类型、运行规律和运作效果,丰富了非正式激励制度的相关研究。
In the context of large country governance and multi-level government,officials at all levels are very likely to reach the"ceiling"of career promotion.Especially in grassroots governance,most officials are more difficult to overcome the ceiling of section-level.How can grassroots government motivate a large number of officials who have no hope of promotion?Based on the case study of the promotion path of grassroots officials in County W,it is found that creating steps and recessive progress incentives play an important role,namely,section-level organizations will evolve tiny steps of implicit promotion incentives in addition to formal job rank promotion.Specifically,these implicit promotion incentives can be classified according to the strength of vertical interaction and horizontal influence of power:serving in developed areas,promoting in team ranking,proximity to political centers,risk aversion and so on.This study presents the operation rules and effects of the ideal type of informal promotion incentive,which is the creation of bureaucratic steps with vivid cases,and enriches the relevant research on informal institutions.
作者
王中正
谭海波
Wang Zhongzhong;Tan Haibo(School of Public Administration,Hunan University,Changsha 410006)
出处
《中国行政管理》
北大核心
2023年第2期53-60,共8页
Chinese Public Administration
基金
国家社科基金重大项目“‘循数智治’:数字技术赋能公共服务高质量发展研究”(编号:21&ZD125)。
关键词
科级天花板
隐性晋升
官员激励
非正式制度
organizational steps
promotion ceiling
implicit incentive
informal system