船舶排放监管演化博弈分析与监管对策研究

Game theory analysis on evolution of ship emission supervision and strategy to succeed

针对船舶大气污染物排放控制区政策实施中存在的船舶违规意愿强、管理机制不全、监管技术手段缺乏的问题,以抑制船舶违法排放、保护大气环境为最终目标,从系统动力学角度出发,结合博弈论方法,建立了“船舶排放控制系统”演化博弈模型和监管系统演化博弈的系统动力学模型,并基于所建立的模型对船舶大气污染物排放控制区政策实施发展进行有效模拟。结果表明:政府的行政成本和监管技术能力对政府的决策有明显的影响;监管技术水平和监管投入情况对航运企业自觉守法的决策有明显影响。为此,建议政府应从加大海事监测监管力量的投入、提升船舶大气污染物排放控制区的监测监管技术水平、建立航运企业绿色发展的长效引导机制三个方面推进船舶排放监测监管工作。

In practicing emission control zone policy,it is found that the management mechanism appears not perfect and the technical means for supervision are not appropriate.As for the opposite side,the ship operators are trying to evade the emission regulations whenever possible.The game theory model of the evolution of ship emission management and the dynamic model of evolutionary game of supervision system are built.They are used to carry out effective simulation of the development of ship emissions pollution control zone policy.The research shows that the government's administrative budget and the technical capability of supervision greatly influence the decisions of the government.Meantime,the supervision capacity and the investment of the government have significant influence on the attitude of the shipping enterprises.Suggestion is given as follows:the government should arrange more investment in strengthening supervision capacity,improving the technical level of supervision technology and developing a long term promotion mechanism for green development.