现象学视域中的移情与美德

Empathy and Virtue from a Phenomenological Perspective

情感主义的美德伦理学对移情的表现、基础和功能进行了详细分析,但这些分析大多基于利普斯以来的移情心理学,而利普斯的移情心理学存在不少误解,例如移情是模仿;移情是投射;移情不仅是一种感受行为,而且也是这种感受行为的结果,即一种具体的情感,移情就是同情;移情是同情的基础,是道德行为的充分必要条件。然而,从现象学的视角来看,移情本质上是对他人的认识或理解,它不是对他人的模仿,也不是一种自我的投射,移情是一种中立的意识行为,它不是一种具体的情感,也不构成同情或道德的充分必要条件。就此而言,利普斯的移情心理学因其自身的缺陷,并不能为情感主义的美德伦理学奠定真正的基础,毋宁说,移情现象学才能为美德伦理学在道德意识层面提供更合理的解释。就道德行为如何可能这一问题而言,理性主义伦理学、亚里士多德主义的美德伦理学和情感主义伦理学,并不是非此即彼、互相排斥的关系,而是可以兼容和互补的。

Emotionalist virtue ethics analyze the expression,basis and function of empathy in detail,but most of these analyses are based on the psychology of empathy developed by Theodor Lipps.Among the many misunderstandings that have emerged about Lipps’theory are that empathy is imitation;empathy is projection;empathy is not only an emotional act of feeling,but also the result of this act;as a specific emotion,empathy is sympathy;and empathy is the basis of sympathy and as such is a necessary and sufficient condition for moral behavior.However,from the phenomenological point of view,empathy is essentially the knowledge or understanding of others;it is not the imitation of others,nor is it a projection of the self.Empathy is a neutral act of consciousness,not a specific emotion,and does not constitute a sufficient condition for sympathy or morality.In this regard,the shortcomings of Lipps’psychology of empathy mean that it does not provide a real basis for emotionalist virtue ethics.Rather,it is the phenomenology of empathy that provides a more rational explanation for virtue ethics at the level of moral consciousness.In terms of how moral behavior is possible,rationalist ethics,Aristotelian virtue ethics,and emotionalist ethics are not mutually exclusive,but compatible and complementary.