流域排水权配置研究的动态演化博弈分析——基于横向府际合作视角

Dynamic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Flood Drainage Rights Allocation in the Basin——Based on the Perspective of Horizontal Intergovernmental Cooperation

气候变化造成我国洪水灾害频发。流域内政府间为了维护自身利益,时有排水冲突现象发生,影响沿线社会经济平稳运行。针对洪涝灾害时期排水冲突不断的现实问题,从横向府际合作视角出发,建立流域内横向政府间的动态演化博弈模型,分析其行为策略选择的长期演化趋势,刻画影响因素变化对横向政府行为策略选择的影响程度。研究表明,流域内横向政府合作排水是系统实现最优策略组合的前提。只有推动横向府际合作关系,上下游政府均合规排水,避免排水冲突现象发生,形成有序排水的局面,才能实现社会福利最大化,从而实现促进流域整体可持续发展、降低流域社会经济损失的目标。

Climate change causes frequent floods in China.In order to safeguard their own interests,the horizontal government in the basin sometimes has flood drainage conflicts,which affects the smooth operation of social economy along the line.Aiming at the practical problem of continuous flood drainage conflict during flood disaster,From the perspective of horizontal inter-governmental cooperation,This paper establishes a dynamic evolutionary game model of horizontal governments in the basin,studies the factors affecting the behavior strategy selection of horizontal governments in the flood drainage process,analyzes the long-term evolution trend of their behavior strategy selection,and describes the influence degree of the changes of influencing factors on the behavior strategy selection of horizontal governments by using Matlab software.The results show that horizontal government cooperative flood drainage is the precondition for the system to realize the optimal strategy combination.Only by promoting horizontal inter-governmental cooperation,both upstream and downstream governments discharge flood in compliance,avoiding flood drainage conflicts and forming an orderly flood drainage situation,can social welfare be maximized,thus achieving the goal of promoting the overall sustainable development of the basin and reducing the social and economic losses of the basin.