“海归”董事会与股价崩盘风险——基于创业板上市公司的检验

“Haigui” Board of Directors and Stock Price Crash Risk--Based on an Examination of GEM listed Companies

文章以2011—2018年间中国创业板上市公司为样本,实证检验“海归”董事会对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现,“海归”董事会能够有效地抑制创业板上市公司股价崩盘风险,即相较于非“海归”董事会创业板上市公司,“海归”董事会创业板上市公司股价崩盘风险更低,而且“海归”比例越高,创业板上市公司股价崩盘风险也更低,这一结论在控制了内生性因素后同样成立。通过进一步在不同情境下的拓展性检验发现,信息披露、制度环境、审计监督在“海归”董事会与创业板上市公司股价崩盘风险之间产生了调节效应,即信息披露程度越好、制度环境越好、审计监督程度越高,则“海归”董事会对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用更强。

With listed companies on China GEM from 2011 to 2018 as samples,the influence of"Haigui"board of directors on the stock price crash risk was tested empirically.The research has found that the"Haigui"board of directors can effectively restrain the risk of stock price collapse of GEM listed companies;i.e.,compared with GEM listed companies without"Haigui"board of directors,the stock price crash risk of GEM listed companies with"Haigui"board of directors is lower,and the higher the proportion of"Haigui"board members in GEM listed companies,the lower the stock price crash risk.This conclusion is also true after endogenous factors are controlled.F urthermore,it is found in extended examinations under various circumstances that information disclosure,institutional environment,and audit supervision have moderating effects between"Haigui"board of directors and the stock price crash nisk of GEM listed companies;in other words,the better the information disclosure,institutional environment,and audit supervision are,the stronger degree to which"Haigui"board of directors will restrain the stock price crash risk.