从心理学审视胡塞尔现象学的困境与出路——对一项哲学史任务的阐明和初步探索

The Dilemma in Husserl s Phenomenology and Its Resolution from a Psychological Perspective:Clarification and Preliminary Exploration of a Task in the History of Philosophy

施皮格伯格曾提出,阐明现象学与心理学之间的关系,是理解胡塞尔哲学最重要的必要条件之一。这一评论实质上蕴含了一项哲学史任务,对这一任务的执行同时有助于加深对心理学的理解。无疑,胡塞尔的现象学兴起于布伦塔诺的心理学,由此决定了现象学与心理学之间必然的内在同一性关系;先验现象学转向导致心理学在其中发生性质的根本变故而从属于先验现象学,这种否定关系既决定于又揭示了先验现象学作为思想迷宫的性质;胡塞尔晚年关于“生活世界”“前述谓经验”等主题的研究,乃是突破这个困境的不同尝试,并表达了向心理学回归的必然趋势。

Herbert Spiegelberg once proposed that one of the most important needs in the understanding of Husserl s philosophy is the clarification of the relationship between his phenomenology and psychology.We might take his proposition as meaning a task for the history of philosophy and,if taken seriously,such clarification will help deepen our understanding of psychology.There is no doubt that Husserl s phenomenology has its original seeds in Brentano s psychology,hence the innermost unification between phenomenology and psychology.The turn toward transcendental phenomenology makes psychology change in nature so that it becomes subordinate to the transcendental phenomenology.This negative relationship is determined by the transcendental phenomenology on the one hand and reveals it as a self-enclosed and dead-ended labyrinth of thought on the other.In his later years Husserl s investigations concerning such issues as life-world and pre-predicative experience might be viewed as efforts trying to find ways out of this labyrinth by returning back to psychology.