非CEO高管独立性与股价崩盘风险

Independence of Non-CEO Executives and Stock Price Crash Risk

文章以2007—2021年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了非CEO高管独立性与股价崩盘风险之间的关系,并从信息透明度视角探究其影响机制。研究发现:非CEO高管独立性与股价崩盘风险呈显著负相关关系,这表明具有独立性的非CEO高管发挥的内部治理效应抑制了股价崩盘风险;影响机制检验结果显示,具有独立性的非CEO高管能够通过提高企业信息透明度抑制股价崩盘风险;异质性分析结果表明,非CEO高管独立性与股价崩盘风险的负相关关系在非国有、外部监督较弱、地区市场化程度较低的企业中更加显著。对此,企业应充分重视和保证高管团队内部的独立性,政府应不断完善信息披露制度,从而保证资本市场持续健康发展,国家金融秩序稳定。

The paper takes A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2021 as research samples to empirically test the relationship between non-CEO executive independence and stock price collapse risk,and explores its impact mechanism from the perspective of information transparency.The study has found that there is a significant negative correlation between the independence of non-CEO executives and the risk of stock price collapse,indicating that the internal governance effect played by non-CEO executives with independence suppresses the risk of stock price collapse.The impact mechanism test results show that non-CEO executives with independence can suppress the risk of stock price collapse by improving corporate information transparency.The results of heterogeneity analysis indicate that the negative correlation between the independence of non-CEO executives and the risk of stock price collapse is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises with weak external supervision and low regional marketization.In this regard,enterprises should fully value and ensure the independence of the executive team,and the government should continuously improve the information disclosure system to ensure the sustained and healthy development of the capital market and the stability of the national financial order.