注意力竞争与适应性选择:基层治理创新的内在逻辑——兼论“伪创新”现象

Attention Competition and Adaptive Choice:The Internal Logic of Primary-level Governance Innovation-- A Discussion on the Phenomenon of"Pseudo-innovation"

基层治理创新已经成为推动基层治理现代化的重要环节。压力型体制下的基层政府为赢得稀缺的注意力开展创新竞赛,却经常出现“创新悖论”“伪创新”现象。“伪创新”是与“实质创新”相对应的,集中表现为政府理性人由于注意力失焦、制度脱耦而引发创新行为的失范、异化。在基层治理的创新场域内,多个创新主体间利益博弈在一定程度上弱化了创新决策的针对性,加之外部制度选择的弱适应性,易导致强创新意愿下的行为偏差与政策失效。为破解基层治理“伪创新”,需构建合理的注意力分配与高耦合度的制度体系,营造宽松的创新容错环境,提升制度韧性,再造基层政府适应能力和治理能力,以实现基层治理创新的实质突破与可持续发展。

Primary-level governance innovation has become an important part in promoting the modernization of primary-level governance.In order to win scarce attention,primary-level governments under the pressure system often launch innovation competitions,but there are often phenomena of"innovation paradox"and"pseudo-innovation","Pseudo-innovation"is contrary to"substantial innovation",which is mainly reflected in the anomie and alienation of innovation behavior of rational people in govermment caused by the attention loss and system decoupling.In the innovation field of primary-level governance,the interest game among multiple innovation subjects weakens the pertinence of innovation decision-making to a certain extent.In addition,the weak adaptability of external system choice is likely to lead to behavior deviation and policy failure under strong innovation willingness.In order to crack the"pseudo-innovation"of primary-level governance,it is necessary to build a reasonable attention distribution and high coupling system,create a better innovation environment for fault tolerance,improve institutional resilience,rebuild the adaptability and governance ability of primary-level governments,so as to achieve substantive breakthrough and sustainable development of primary-level governance innovation.