并购重组利润监管的实体经济效应——基于业绩承诺制度的研究

The Real Economic Effect of Profit Supervision of Mergers and Acquisitions——A Research Based on the Performance Commitment Policy

基于并购重组利润监管政策,本文选取2011-2020年中国A股上市公司数据,研究业绩承诺制度对实体经济的作用。结果发现:并购时有业绩补偿承诺与被并购企业金融化显著负相关;货币政策越宽松和行业竞争度越高,业绩补偿承诺对企业金融化的抑制作用越强。作用机制为:业绩补偿承诺主要通过缓解信息不对称和管理层激励效应抑制企业金融化。进一步地,金融资产特征方面,业绩补偿承诺对企业投资金融资产的波动性、短期金融资产均有显著抑制作用;业绩补偿承诺特征方面,有较高补偿金额、虚高承诺、双向补偿、使用现金支付的业绩承诺协议可以更大程度地抑制企业金融化。研究表明,中国资本市场的业绩承诺制度可以改变企业信息环境和管理层逐利方式,通过抑制企业金融化实现企业健康发展,说明并购重组中的利润监管政策可以产生显著的实体经济促进作用。

This paper studies the impact of the performance commitment policy on real economy growth,based on the profit supervision policy of mergers and acquisitions,by using the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2020.The study found that there is a significant negative correlation between performance based-compensation commitments and corporate financialization in mergers and acquisitions.Looser monetary policy and higher industry competition strengthen the inhibitory effect of performance-based compensation commitments on corporate financialization.The mechanism of action test shows that these commitments mainly inhibit corporate financialization through information effect and management incentive effect.Further analysis shows that,from the perspective of financialization characteristics,performance-based compensation commitments have a significant inhibitory effect on the volatility of financial assets and short-term financial assets.Judging from the characteristics of performance-based compensation commitments,such as higher compensation amounts,falsely high commitments,two-way compensation,and cash payment compensation can all restrain the financialization of enterprises to agreaterextent.This study shows that the performance commitment policy in China's capital market can change the information environment of enterprises and the way that management pursues profits,leading to a shift from virtual to real by inhibiting financialization effect.