全链接担责视域下关闭企业遗留污染场地第三方治理激励模型

Incentive model for third-party remediation of legacy contamination sites left by closed enterprises from the perspective of fully linked accountability

目前我国关闭企业遗留污染场地挤占了大量土地资源,潜在风险极高,需要在进行生态修复后,才能重新开发利用.在当前我国污染治理要求全链接担责的背景下,属地政府通过对违法行为的“严惩重罚”一定程度上可消弭关闭企业治污意愿的缺失,但因成本和技术约束,需要引入第三方参与治理,可能导致信息不对称下企业间合谋行为的发生.为此,研究基于属地政府、关闭企业和第三方生态修复企业的多重委托代理关系,分析了是否存在企业间合谋行为的三方主体利益博弈,构建了基于全链接担责的关闭企业遗留污染场地第三方治理激励模型.研究表明:1)属地政府是否实施企业合谋惩罚取决于生态修复企业的治污努力边际成本和应对风险的能力;2)适当的生态修复标准、强大的企业应对外部环境风险能力,不仅可以有效地激励企业治污,还能防范合谋;3)过于严苛的惩罚并不会带来约束效果的明显提升,运用市场激励、公众参与监督机制,可实现各主体利益均衡.

At present,legacy contamination sites left by closed enterprises occupy a lot of land resources in China,which are in high potential risks and could be reused only after ecological restoration.Under the current background of China’s pollution control requiring fully linked accountability,the local government could eliminate the lack of willingness to pollution control for closed enterprises through severe punishment with their illegal behaviors.However,due to the cost and technical constraints,it is necessary to adopt a third-party to participate in remediation,which may lead to the collusion among enterprises under information asymmetry.Therefore,based on the multiple principal-agent relationships among the local government,the closed enterprise and the third-party ecological remediation enterprise,this paper analyzes the game of these three parties with collusion and no collusion,and conducts a third-party remediation incentive model of the legacy contamination left by the closed enterprise based on fully linked responsibility.The results show that:1)Whether the local government implements the punishment of enterprise collusion depends on the marginal cost of pollution control efforts and the ability to deal with risks of ecological restoration enterprises.2)Appropriate ecological restoration standards and strong ability of enterprise to cope with external environmental risks can not only effectively motivate enterprises to control pollution,but also prevent collusion.3)Too severe punishment will not bring significant improvement of the restraint effect,while the adoption of market incentive,public participation in the supervision mechanism,can achieve the balance of participants’interests.