考虑转移支付的京津冀大气污染协同治理三方演化博弈研究

Collaborative Governance of Air Pollution in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei with Transfer Payment Using Evolutionary Game

京津冀地区是我国大气污染最为严重的地区之一,也是最早开展大气污染协同治理的区域.协同主体之间的互动关系是大气污染协同治理中值得探讨的问题,考虑了京津冀地区协同主体间的转移支付,建立三方演化博弈模型,以研究协同主体之间的互动关系对京津冀地区大气污染协同治理效果的影响.研究表明,京津冀三方协同主体的策略选择受其自身内部效益,外部效用及转移支付的影响,从而对京津冀地区大气污染协同治理效果产生影响.

Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei is the region with the most serious air pollution in China.Also,it is the earliest regions to carry out collaborative control of air pollution.In this paper,a game model with transfer payoff are used to study the air pollution control problem in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region.First,a tripartite evolutionary game is modelled with Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei as three players respectively.Second,the transfer payment among the governments are modelled in the payoff function.Then,the dynamic evolutionary equilibrium is obtained.Results in this paper show that the air pollution control strategy of the three governments depend on internal benefits,external benefits and transfer payment.