零售供应链中的区块链参与决策与产品定价博弈模型

Game Model of Blockchain Adoption and Product Pricing in Retail Supply Chain

考虑由两个供应商和一个大型零售商(如沃尔玛)组成的供应链,其中零售商已搭建了区块链溯源平台,供应商可选择加入此平台(简称“上链”)以提升产品品牌形象、获得更多消费者青睐。两个供应商品牌形象有差异,以H表示品牌形象较好的供应商,L品牌形象表示较差的供应商。针对供应商的“上链”决策与产品定价问题,建立了关于“上链”、批发价与零售价的动态博弈模型,刻画了博弈均衡和均衡下各方的利润分配,对比4种不同“上链”情况下的博弈均衡,分析了供应商加入区块链平台的激励以及零售商对供应商“上链”的偏好。结果表明:仅L“上链”时,零售商的利润将会增加,而仅H“上链”时,零售商的利润可能会受损;而且H“上链”能使L受益,相反,L“上链”会使H受损。但是,H与L“上链”对自身而言不一定有利,这取决于产品生产成本、品牌差异化程度以及区块链对消费者的产品估值的影响。与仅L“上链”相比,H、L都“上链”将使双方受益,但零售商可能受损。与仅H“上链”相比,H、L都“上链”将使零售商受益、H受损,而L则不一定受益。与H、L均不“上链”相比,H、L同时“上链”将使各方均受益。研究结论为大型零售企业在区块链背景下的供应链管理提供了有益的管理启示。

Recently,food contamination incidents have occurred frequently.To deal with food safety issues and enhance brand image,many large retail companies(e.g.,Walmart)have deployed blockchain technology to improve the transparency of their supply chains.,which can make the source traceable and the responsibility accountable.Since then,retailers have begun to encourage more suppliers to join their own blockchain platforms.However,when there is competition among suppliers,suppliers must not only weigh the advantages(brand image enhancement)and disadvantages(cost)of joining the blockchain platform,but also consider the multi-party game with competitors and retailers.Therefore,it is meaningful to study the participation incentive and preference of supply chain members for blockchain.Motivated by retailers'practice,a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and a large retailer is considered,in which the retailer has built a blockchain platform for tracing products,the suppliers may choose to join this blockchain platform(abbreviates""join the chain")to enhance their product images and attract more consumers.The suppliers have different brand image initially,let H represents the high image supplier,while L the low image supplier.Aiming at the problem of whether the suppliers should"join the chain"and how to price,a dynamic game model of blockchain adoption and product pricing(including wholesale prices and retail prices)is built,and the game equilibriums and the profit distributions are characterized under four different blockchain adoption scenarios.The incentives of suppliers joining the chain and the retailer's preference to scenarios are analyzed.(i)Results show that the retailer's profit will increase when only L"joins the chain",but it may decrease when only H"joins the chain".Moreover,H"joining the chain"can benefit L,while L"joining the chain"will hurt H.However,H and L both"join the chain"is not necessarily beneficial to themselves,it depends on the production cost of products,the degree of brand difference and the impact of blockchain on consumers'valuation of product.(i)Compared with only L"joining the chain",both H and L"joining the chain"will benefit both parties,but the retailer may suffer.(i-i)Compared with only H"joining the chain",both H and L"joining the chain"will benefit retailers,but H will suffer and L may suffer as well.Compared with H and L both"not joining the chain",both H and L"joining the chain"at the same time may benefit all parties.(iv)Based on the basic model,the influence of production cost difference and the impact of positive blockchain variable cost are discussed,and it is found that our conclusions are robust under mild conditions.The conclusions of this study provide useful managerial implications for managing retail supply chain under the background of blockchain.