股权质押、分析师关注与股价同步性

Equity Pledge,Analyst Attention and Stock Price Synchronization

股权质押作为被控股股东广泛采用的融资手段,在缓解融资约束的同时,也产生了一些公司弱化公司信息披露质量和增加个股的股价同步性的问题。选取2015-2019年间沪、深A股上市公司为样本,先从公司内部考察股权质押对股价同步性的影响,再从外部角度研究分析师行为对股价同步性的影响,并在此基础上探讨分析师的调节作用。研究结果表明,控股股东股权质押与股价同步性呈显著正相关,且二者的正相关关系在非国有企业中更强;分析师关注与股价同步性呈显著负相关;分析师关注对股权质押与股价同步性之间的关系具有负向调节作用,且该调节作用在非国有企业中更显著。

As a financing method widely adopted by controlling shareholders,equity pledge not only alleviates financing constraints,but also causes problems that some companies weaken the quality of information disclosure and increase the synchronization of stock prices.This paper selects a-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015 to 2019 as samples.It first examines the impact of equity pledge on stock price synchronization from the company’s internal perspective,and then studies the impact of analyst behavior on stock price synchronization from the external perspective,and on this basis discusses the moderating role of analysts.The results show that:there is a significant positive correlation between equity pledge and stock price synchronization,and the positive correlation is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises.There is a significant negative correlation between analysts’attention and stock price synchronization.Analysts’attention has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between equity pledge and stock price synchronization,and this moderating effect is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.