煤炭资源枯竭型城市绿色转型三方演化博弈分析——基于中央政府奖励制度视角

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Transformation in Coal Resource-exhausted Cities——From the Perspective of the Central Government Reward System

为了促进煤炭资源枯竭型城市的可持续发展,在分析地方政府、企业和居民的利益冲突基础上,构建中央政府奖励制度下煤炭资源枯竭型城市绿色转型三方演化博弈模型,并给出促进地方政府、企业和居民积极参与绿色转型的建议。研究结论表明:煤炭资源枯竭型城市的绿色转型离不开中央政府的支持,仅仅依靠地方政府无法促进企业绿色转型;当地方政府和居民对企业不绿色转型的处罚较轻时,中央政府需要付出更高的成本来促进地方政府、企业和居民积极参与绿色转型;当地方政府和居民对企业绿色转型的补贴力度和支持力度越大时,企业从中央政府处获得的绿色转型奖励越少,而地方政府和居民从中央政府处获得的奖励则越多。

In order to promote the sustainable development of coal resource-exhausted cities,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of green transformation under the central government reward system by analyzing the conflict of interests between local governments,enterprises and residents,and gives suggestions to promote local governments,enterprises and residents to actively participate in green transformation.The results show that:the green transformation in coal resource-exhausted cities cannot be achieved without the support of the central government,and the local government alone cannot promote the green transformation of enterprises;the central government needs to pay higher cost to promote local governments,enterprises and residents to actively participate in green transformation when the punishments of local governments and residents to non green transformation enterprises are relatively light;the less enterprises get green transformation rewards,the more rewards that local governments and residents get from the central government when they give more subsidies and supports to the enterprises’green transformation.