非CEO高管独立性的治理效应——基于审计定价的证据

Governance Effects of Non-CEO Executive Independence:Evidence Based on Audit Pricing

从高管团队内部治理角度出发,当非CEO高管相对于CEO具有较强的独立性时,可以对CEO的不当行为发挥“自下而上”的制约与平衡作用。基于会计信息外部监督者的视角,通过考察会计师事务所对客户非CEO高管独立性的反应,来揭示企业非CEO高管独立性的治理效应。研究发现:非CEO高管独立性越高,则会计师事务所的审计定价越低。机制检验表明,上述结果主要因企业财务报表错报风险和经营风险下降导致。此外,当非CEO高管约束能力更强时,非CEO高管独立性能够更加有效地发挥治理效应,进而降低事务所的审计定价;且这一关系在董事会监督效率较低、事务所类型为“非十大”的企业当中尤为明显。进一步研究表明,非CEO高管独立性提高了企业收到标准无保留意见的概率;而且即使审计定价降低,审计质量也并未下降。研究结论为明晰非CEO高管独立性的治理机制提供了重要依据,对于上市公司优化管理层结构以及事务所进行审计决策具有一定的借鉴意义。

From the perspective of internal governance of the executive team,when non-CEO executives have stronger independence from the CEO,they can play a“bottom-up”role in checking and balancing the misconduct of the CEO.Based on the perspective of an external monitor of accounting information,this paper examines the governance effects of non-CEO executive independence by examining accounting firms responses to the independence of non-CEO executives of their clients.It is found that higher non-CEO executive independence is associated with lower audit pricing by accounting firms.Mechanistic tests indicate that the above results are mainly due to a decrease in the risk of misstatement of corporate financial statements and operational risk.In addition,when non-CEO executives have greater discipline,non-CEO executive independence has a more effective governance effect,which in turn reduces firm audit pricing;this relationship is particularly pronounced in firms with less effective board oversight and“non-big 10”.Further research shows that non-CEO executive independence increases the probability of receiving a standard unqualified opinion;and even if the audit pricing is reduced,the audit quality does not decline.The findings of this study provide an important basis for clarifying the governance mechanism of non-CEO executive independence,and have implications for listed companies to optimize their management structure and firms audit decisions.