问询监管的公司治理作用——基于双重代理成本视角

The Corporate Governance Effect of Comment Letters Supervision:Evidence from the Dual Agency Costs

本文以2014-2018年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,从双重代理成本视角考察问询监管作为一种外部治理机制能否甄别公司代理问题,以及问询监管能否帮助公司降低代理成本.研究发现,公司历史双重代理问题越严重,其越易被交易所精准问询监管.在问询监管的经济后果方面,问询监管能有效降低公司未来的双重代理成本,且其治理作用在具有"双重代理成本特征"的问询监管情景中更明显.采用PSM-DID控制内生性后,该结果亦稳健.进一步地,当问询监管力度更大和年审会计师核查问询函时,问询监管会对双重代理成本发挥更强的治理作用.当公司为国有企业时,问询监管对公司双重代理成本的治理作用欠佳;当公司处于低市场化环境时,问询监管对双重代理成本的治理作用更显著.本文从双重代理成本视角提供了交易所精准问询监管的事前约束作用和公司治理作用,对深入解读问询监管治理作用的内在机理提供新的经验依据.

Taking Chinese A-share listed firms from 2014 to 2018 as our samples,this paper examines whether firms'dual agency problems are concerned in comment letters su-pervision from the stock exchanges,and how is the governance effect of comment letters supervison on the dual agency costs.The empirical results show that firms with serious history dual agency problems are more likely to be accurately issued comment letters supervison.In terms of the economic consequence of comment letters supervison,we find that the comment letters supervison can effectively reduce firms'future dual agency costs,and this governance effect is more pronounced when there are questions on dual agency cost characteristics in firm's comment letters supervison.After employing PSM-DID to control endogenesis,the main results are still steady.Furthermore,when the intensity of comment letters supervison is stronger or the firm's auditor is required to inspect the questions in comment letters,the governance effect of comment letters supervision on firms'dual agency costs is more obvious.When the company is state-owned enterprise,the governance effect of comment letters supervison on firms'dual agency costs is not effective;and when considering the company located in the marketization environment,the governance effect of comment letters supervison is more pronounced in the areas with poor marketization environment.To sum up,our findings provide new evidence that the pre-constraint effect and corporate governance effect of stock exchanges'front-line precise inquiries from the perspective of dual agency cost,and deeply interpret the internal governance role of comment letters supervision.