摘要
考虑决策者非完全理性对风险偏好的影响,将前景理论和心理账户理论相结合引入共享制造多主体演化博弈过程中,构建效价账户和成本账户前景收益感知矩阵,分析各博弈主体动态演化规律。结果表明:(1)共享制造供需双方诚信共享、共享平台监管这一理论最优策略组合并非总是实际中的最优组合;(2)效价和成本感知偏差、价值感知参照点、低估高概率事件、风险偏好等关键因素的存在使共享系统存在系统性误差,从而影响共享系统的安全与稳定;(3)成本感知、惩罚机制、风险外溢、参照点、诚信共享收益等要素值的调整有助于实现共享系统最优状态。
Considering the impact of decision makers'imperfect rationality on risk preference,this paper combines prospect theory and mental account theory into the process of shared manufacturing multi-agent evolutionary game,and constructs the valence account and cost account prospective benefit perception matrix.And then,it analyzes the dynamic evolution law of each game subject.Results show that,the theoretical optimal strategy combination of shared manufacturing supply and demand sharing of integrity and sharing of platform supervision is not always the best combination in practice.Perceived deviation of valence and cost,reference point of value perception,and underestimation the existence of key factors such as high-probability events and risk preferences make the sharing system have systematic errors,thereby affecting the security and sta-bility of the sharing system.Cost perception,punishment mechanism,risk spillover,reference points,honesty and sharing benefits and other element values Adjustment helps to achieve the optimal state of the shared system.
作者
王新平
张子鸣
WANG Xin-ping;ZHANG Zi-ming(School of Management,Xi'an University of Science and Technology,Xi'an 710054)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第4期68-77,108,共11页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71673220)。
关键词
机会主义共享行为
共享制造
风险偏好
演化博弈
opportunistic shared behavior
shared manufacturing
risk preference
evolutionary game