审计关系错配与企业投资效率

Audit Relationship Mismatch and Enterprise Investment Efficiency

文章基于2016-2020年A股上市公司数据,分析审计关系错配对企业投资效率的影响及作用机制,探究客户——审计师关系暗含的企业内部治理机制和外部监督力量之间的博弈。研究结果显示:审计关系错配区分向上错配与向下错配两种,其中,向上错配关系与企业投资效率呈正相关关系,向下错配关系与企业投资效率呈负相关关系,而良好的治理环境有助于弱化错配关系对投资效率的影响。机制检验发现,向上错配主要是通过监督治理渠道降低企业过度投资,从而实现投资效率的提升;而向下错配通过信号传递渠道导致企业投资效率降低。研究丰富了审计关系错配经济后果文献,有助于厘清外部监管与企业行为间的互动关系,对促进审计市场良性关系发展具有一定现实意义。

This paper uses the number of samples of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2016 to 2020 to investigate the auditors’impact on enterprise investment effi ciency,exploring the relationship between client and auditor implies the game between internal governance mechanism and external supervision force.The results show that the audit mismatch is divided into two types:upward mismatch and downward mismatch,the upward mismatch is positively correlated with the investment efficiency of enterprises,while the downward mismatch is negatively correlated with the investment efficiency of enterprises.And the influence of mismatch relationship on investment efficiency will be weakened with the improvement of internal and external governance environment.Mechanism tests shows that the client-auditor upward mismatches reduce the company’s excessive investment by Supervision and governance channels,thereby enhancing investment effi ciency;and the client-auditor downward mismatches reduce enterprise investment effi ciency through signal delivery channels.This study enriches the relevant literature on the economic consequences of audit relationship mismatch,helps to clarify the interaction between external supervision and enterprise behavior,which has a certain practical signifi cance for promoting the benign circulation of the relationship between customers and auditors.