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网红带货对销售企业盈利影响研究 被引量:2

The impact of internet celebrity live delivery on the profitability of sales enterprises
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摘要 近年来,越来越多的品牌商采取“网红带货”这一商业模式。品牌商聘请网红在直播平台宣传销售产品。本文研究了网红选品能力和市场中冲动消费者比例对品牌商利润的影响。本文得到如下管理启发:如果品牌商与选品能力不强的网红达成合作,那么冲动消费者比例较小的市场对品牌商更有利并且市场中的冲动消费者越多,产品价格越低。如果品牌商与选品能力较强的网红达成合作,那么冲动消费者比例较大的市场对品牌商更为有利并且市场中的冲动消费者越多,产品价格越高。 Due to the absence of physical evaluation in online shopping,consumers have no idea about the exact value of products.In recent years,the business model of“weblebrity marketing”has been widely introduced by online brands to alleviate consumers′uncertainty about product value.Weblebrities with influence and product selection skills are hired to promote and sell products to consumers in real time on livestreaming platforms.As proven,the collaboration between weblebrities and brands is a success and brings huge benefits.In the pre-sale on November 11,2021,Li Jiaqi and Viya reached a cumulative trading value of RMB 10.653 billion and 8.552 billion,respectively.However,the prosperity of“weblebrity marketing”combines some things to watch out for.Compared with the previous sales model,“weblebrity marketing”is frequently accompanied by a higher return rate.China Consumer News reported an alarming return rate of 40%for some weblebrities.According to a report published by China Consumers Association in 2020,60.5%of respondents who refuse to buy through“weblebrity marketing”were concerned about the quality of products,and 44.1%felt there was an extensive impulse purchase.When selling products,brands are not sure whether their products are of high or low value to consumers.After the production selection of weblebrities,brands enter into a partnership with them and have them convince consumers in the market that the products are of high value.Through observation,there are two types of consumers,namely rational consumers and impulsive consumers.Based on prior information about a product′s value and the weblebrity′s ability to select products,rational consumers perform Bayesian updates to get posterior information about the product and decide whether to buy it or not.Impulse consumers,by contrast,buy into the hype of weblebrities.For each transaction,the weblebrity is rewarded with a commission.After receiving the product,consumers decide whether to return it based on its true value.Where returns occur,they have to pay certain costs(e.g.hassle and mailing costs)before being refunded in full.The brand will receive the product,but will not ask the weblebrity to return the commission for the transaction.In spite of the academic concerns about“weblebrity marketing”,scholars have mostly conducted research through qualitative rather than quantitative analysis.In view of this,this paper builds a mathematical model to address the following two questions:(1)How does the ability of weblebrities to select products affect the pricing and profitability of brands?(2)How does the proportion of impulsive consumers in the market affect the pricing and profitability of brands?In this paper,a Bayesian update model of consumers is established.Through the sales model of“weblebrity marketing”,brands sell their products to a market of rational and impulsive consumers.Watching the weblebrities′judgment on the value of products,consumers are faced with the first decision-making,i.e.,to buy or to give up.After the purchase,consumers decide whether to return or keep the product.Impulsive consumers completely trust weblebrities′propaganda,while rational consumers make estimates of product value based on a priori information and weblebrities′product selection ability.According to their behavior in the marketplace,consumers are classified into three types:(1)Type A,who keeps all the products they buy,regardless of their actual value;(2)Type B,who keeps the high-value products they buy and return the low-value ones;and(3)Type C,who returns all the products they buy.It goes in a sequence that:weblebrities announce the high value of products,rational and impulsive consumers enter the market and decide whether to buy the products,weblebrities make profits,rational and impulsive consumers decide whether to return the products,and brands make profits.This paper identifies how weblebrities′product selection ability and impulse consumers′proportion in the market affect brands′profitability,especially brands should work with weblebrities with what selection ability and they should develop what pricing strategies in markets with different proportions of impulse consumers.Conclusions are:First,brands′profits are non-monotonically correlated with weblebrities′product selection ability at low proportions of impulse consumers;incrementally correlated with weblebrities′product selection ability at high proportions of impulse consumers.Second,brands′profits are decreasingly correlated with impulse consumers′proportion at low selection ability of weblebrities;non-monotonically correlated with impulse consumers′proportion at medium selection ability of weblebrities;and increasingly correlated with impulse consumers′proportion at high selection ability of weblebrities.The findings have considerable implications for management:First,brands should minimize returns by reducing consumer uncertainty about product value rather than changing prices.Second,in the product sales model of“weblebrity marketing”,brands should attach importance to weblebrities′product selection ability and impulse consumers′proportion in the market.Specifically,markets with a small proportion of impulsive consumers are more beneficial to brands when the weblebrities they cooperate with are less able to select products.The more impulse consumers there are,the lower the price of products.Conversely,markets with a large proportion of impulsive consumers are more beneficial to brands when the selected weblebrities are good at selecting products.The more impulse consumers there are,the higher the price should be.Lastly,the higher the commission for weblebrities they cooperate with,the lower the price brands should set.
作者 刘焱洪 张建雄 LIU Yanhong;ZHANG Jianxiong(Department of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSCD 北大核心 2023年第3期60-68,共9页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71971152)。
关键词 网红带货 贝叶斯更新 退货政策 产品定价 Internet celebrity live delivery Bayesian update Return policy Pricing
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