基于前景理论的重大工程协同创新资源共享演化分析

Evolutionary analysis of resource sharing of collaborative innovation in major infrastructure projects based on prospect theory

重大基础设施工程的深度不确定性为项目技术和建设管理创新带来更多机会和挑战。为了促进多主体协同创新效率、揭示行为演化规律,本文从协同创新主体之间资源共享的角度,基于前景理论的有限理性假设,构建了融入前景价值函数和权重函数的资源共享前景值矩阵,分析了资源提供方与资源接收方在协同创新决策中的动态演化过程,通过数值模拟讨论了影响资源共享演化稳定结果的主要因素。研究发现存在某个最优协同收益分配比例使系统更快收敛到最优结果;资源共享意愿与创新收益系数呈正相关,与前期成本呈负相关;风险偏好、损失敏感度、环境不确定性等参数会在一定条件下对演化结果产生不同程度的影响。从创新合作伙伴选择、信息交流平台构建、协同利益分配、风险管理、心理意识调节几个方面提出促进重大工程协同创新资源共享的建议。

Major infrastructure projects have obvious environmental uncertainty and technical complexity,which bring great challenges to construction and increase the demand for technological innovation.However,it is difficult for a single enterprise to make great achievements in the technological innovation of major infrastructure projects on its own.Solving technical problems faced in major infrastructure projects requires collaborative innovation across organizations,departments,industries and regions.Currently,there is a lack of research on the collaborative innovation of major infrastructure projects,especially on the organizational behaviour of collaborative innovation,which cannot meet the theoretical research and practical needs of the rapid development of major infrastructure projects.As a key factor affecting the efficiency of collaborative innovation,resource sharing has attracted increasing attention.To find the law of system evolution,an evolutionary analysis was carried out on collaborative innovation resource sharing of major infrastructure projects.Research on resource sharing behaviour among the collaborative innovation subjects of major infrastructure projects is conducive to improving the resource sharing consciousness of each subject,improving the efficiency of the innovation system,and providing theoretical support for the smooth implementation of major infrastructure projects.Considering the bounded rationality of actors and the uncertain environment of major infrastructure projects,this paper combines evolutionary game theory with prospect theory to study the resource sharing strategy behaviours between different subjects in the process of collaborative innovation of major infrastructure projects;and analyzes the dynamic evolution process of behaviour decision-making.First,based on the bounded rationality hypothesis of prospect theory,a resource sharing payment matrix integrating the prospect value function and weight function is constructed.Then,using the replication dynamic equation,the evolutionary game dynamic model of the resource demander and resource provider is established,and five possible evolutionary equilibrium points are obtained.Then,the stability of each equilibrium point is determined by using the Jacobian matrix.This is followed by an analysis of the equilibrium in each case,the main objective factors affecting the convergence of the system to the best advantage,the main behaviour characteristic factors and the reasons why the system has difficulty converging to the optimal equilibrium state.Next,through MATLAB system simulation,the main factors affecting the evolutionary results of the resource sharing system are analysed.Finally,the research conclusions are drawn,and some suggestions are put forward to promote the collaborative innovation of major infrastructure projects.The research shows the following:(1)The resource sharing evolution system of collaborative innovation of major infrastructure projects can evolve into two results(of resource sharing and resource receiving)and(of resource not sharing and resource not receiving).The specific evolution result is affected by the initial value of the group and various parameters.(2)The probability of the system evolving into a good result of sharing resources and receiving resources is positively correlated with the benefit coefficient of collaborative innovation and negatively correlated with the early cost.Improving the benefit coefficient of innovation and reducing the early cost can promote the resource sharing behaviours of multiagent collaborative innovation.Therefore,in the process of collaborative innovation,interested parties should pay attention to cultivating members′innovation consciousness and give full play,as much as possible,to the heterogeneous advantage of resources.(3)There is an optimal allocation proportion to make the system converge to a good result of the stability strategy faster.Therefore,a scientific and reasonable benefit allocation mechanism of collaborative innovation should be established.(4)System evolution is affected by environmental uncertainty,and can evolve into the optimal result only when the degree of uncertainty is very small or the ability of the collaborative innovation subject is strong.Therefore,when selecting collaborative innovation partners in the face of a high uncertainty environment,interested parties should pay attention to the innovation ability of partners.(5)The greater the risk preference of the actors in the face of loss,the more it can promote the evolution of the system into the result of resource sharing.However,it is worth noting that interested parties should pay attention to strengthening the risk management of collaborative innovation resource sharing and preventing the negative impact of overconfidence on the efficiency of collaborative innovation resource sharing.