农产品供应链视角下食品安全的激励机制研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Food Safety from the Perspective of Agricultural Products Supply Chain

在一个风险中性的食品加工企业和风险规避型的农产品供应商所构成的二级供应链中,考虑因供应链中信息不畅导致的道德风险与逆向选择,最终导致农产品和食品质量出现的问题,应用委托-代理理论相关知识,构建食品加工企业的激励机制模型,探讨食品加工企业为了从农产品供应商获得优质农产品的合同设计问题.在比较不同信息条件下二级供应链及其成员的收益的基础上,从供应链管理的角度提出解决食品质量安全的对策.

In a two-level supply chain composed of a risk-neutral food processor and a risk-averse agricultural product supplier,considering the moral hazard and adverse selection caused by poor information in the supply chain,which eventually leads to problems in the quality of agricultural products and food,the incentive mechanism model of food processing enterprises is constructed by using the relevant knowledge of principal-agent theory,and the contract design problem of food processing enterprises to obtain high-quality agricultural products from agricultural product suppliers is discussed.Based on comparing the benefits of the two-level supply chain and its members under different information conditions,we propose countermeasures to solve food quality and safety from the perspective of supply chain management.