抓住“关键少数”防范债务风险——基于地方政府融资平台新增债务的分析

Leading Cadre Connectedness and Newly increased Debts of Local Government Financing Vehicles

基于2008—2020年263个市级地方政府直接控股的751家融资平台的新增债务数据,本文发现核心高管更替会使得融资平台在其所对应的地方党政主要领导任职期间年均新增更多的债务。上述结论不受党政主要领导年龄的影响,并且在全国范围内都显著成立。通过对2015年以来历年的债务治理政策进行评估,本文进一步发现:发行地方政府债券对融资平台新增债务的抑制作用并不大;并且,债务治理政策对融资平台新增债务的抑制作用很大程度上取决于政策的执行力度。基于上述实证结果,我们对防范地方政府债务风险提供了相应的政策建议。

Based on the newly increased debt data of 751 local government financing vehicles(LGFVs) directly controlled by 263 prefecture-level governments from 2008 to 2020, we find that the turnover of LGFV’s core executives, i.e., chairman and/or CEO, in the term of the local leading cadre, i.e., the secretary of the local party committee or the local government leader, will on average cause the LGFV to increase more debts per year during the term of the corresponding leading cadre. The above conclusion is not affected by the age of leading cadres and holds significantly in all regions in China. By evaluating the debt governance policies since 2015, we find that the issuance of local government bonds has a very little restraining effect on the newly increased debts of LGFVs, and the strength of policy implementation determines the restraining effect of debt governance policies on the newly increased debts of LGFVs. Based on the above empirical results, we provide some policy recommendations for preventing local government debt risks.