摘要
本文分析了广州车牌配置结果的效率和公平以及博士和博士后人才补贴对车牌配置结果的影响。首先分析了广州车牌分配博弈的均衡:由于参与人只能选择一种方式获得车牌,均衡中对车牌支付意愿高的人参加拍卖,对车牌支付意愿低的人参加摇号。其次,根据车牌分配数据估计表明,消费者剩余和拍卖收入约为5∶1,车牌可得性机会分布的基尼系数为0.42。最后,人才补贴会提高车牌拍卖的价格,减少拍卖净收入,对车牌分配结果的效率和公平的影响不定,依赖具有补贴资格参与者的分布情况。
Guangzhou city is the first city to use the auction and lottery hybrid mechanism to allocate the car plates in traffic restriction cities. The efficiency and equity of allocation and the effects of talent subsidy are analyzed. Firstly, the Nash equilibrium of the game under Guangzhou Mechanism is analyzed and the willingness to pay for the car plates of auction participants are higher than the willingness to pay of the lottery participants. Secondly, after estimating the tail distribution of the participants’ willingness to pay, we find that the ratio of the consumer surplus to the revenue is about 5∶1, and the Gini coefficient of car plate accessibility is 0.42. Thirdly, we find that the talent subsidy may increase the bidding price and decrease the revenue from the car plate auction. The effect of talent subsidy on the efficiency and equity of allocation depends on the distribution of the willingness to pay of qualified participants of the talent subsidy.
作者
聂海峰
Haifeng Nie(Lingnan College,Sun Yat-sen University)
出处
《经济学报》
2023年第1期260-279,共20页
China Journal of Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“增强消费对经济发展的基础性作用研究”(项目编号:21ZDA036)
广东省自然科学基金重点项目(2018B030311053)的资助。
