轴辐合谋、社会福利与所有制结构

Hub-and-Spoke Collusion,Social Welfare and Ownership Structure

本文考虑上游平台供应商和下游双寡头零售商进行信息合谋的轴辐合谋模型,探究所有制结构和议价能力对轴辐合谋的稳定性及社会福利的影响。研究发现,当供应商为民营时,轴辐合谋的稳定性随市场低需求概率的增加而增加,随零售商议价能力的提高而降低。轴辐合谋在合谋约束较紧且零售商的议价能力较高时,将有损社会福利;反之则反。公有供应商相比于民营供应商削弱轴辐合谋稳定性,但在合谋约束松紧程度适中时却较难形成福利优势。

Considering a hub-and-spoke collusion where a supplier and duopolistic retailers collude on information,we try to investigate the impact of ownership and bargaining power on the stability of hub-and-spoke collusion and social welfare.We find that with a private supplier,the stability of hub-and-spoke collusion increases in the probability of low market demand,but decreases in the retailers'bargaining power.The hub-and-spoke collusion hurts social welfare with high retailers'bargaining power and tight collusion constraints and vice versa.Compared to a private supplier,a public supplier destabilizes hub-and-spoke collusion,but tends to decrease social welfare under modest collusion constraints.