智能快递柜机制下用户取件与快递员配送策略的演化博弈研究

Research on Evolutionary Game Between User Pickup and Courier Delivery Strategy Under the Intelligent Express Cabinet Mechanism

目前快递员不遵循用户意愿擅自投递的行为较为常见,影响用户对智能快递柜的接受度,不利于缓解配送压力。文章为用户与快递员构建演化博弈收益模型,探究双方策略选择的影响因素并得出结论:若用户投诉后获得的补贴收益与配送环境的改善效益之和减去投诉成本后大于快递柜保管的便利性时,用户会选择拒绝使用快递柜;若快递员擅自投柜带来的效率收益减去承担的罚款和投柜费用后仍大于按需配送扣除相关成本后的职业道德收益,快递员会擅自投递于快递柜。

At present,it is common for couriers to deliver goods without following users,wishes,which affects users,acceptance of intelligent express cabinets and is not conducive to relieving distribution pressure.This paper constructs an evolutionary game revenue model for users and couriers,explores the factors that influence the strategic choice of both parties,and draws the conclusion that if the sum of the subsidy benefits obtained after users complain and the improvement benefits of the distribution environment minus the cost of complaint is greater than the convenience of the storage of the express cabinet,users will refuse to use the express cabinet;If the efficiency gains brought by the courier's unauthorized delivery minus the penalty and delivery costs are still greater than the professional ethics gains after the on-demand delivery minus the relevant costs,the courier will use the express cabinet for delivery without authorization.