矿山地质环境治理项目主体演化博弈及利益协调

Subject evolution game and interest coordination of mine geological environment management project

为研究矿山地质环境治理PPP项目运营过程中各主体利益冲突的形成机理,采用博弈论构建地方政府、企业、公众三方的演化博弈模型,建立收益矩阵,利用复制动态方程原理和李雅普洛夫稳定性理论对模型进行求解分析,研究各主体策略稳定的条件和博弈系统稳定条件,运用Matlab对博弈过程进行数值仿真分析,研究上级部门对地方政府的罚款、地方政府对企业的奖励系数以及对公众的补偿系数等参数变化对主体策略选择的影响。结果表明:地方政府的决策很大程度影响企业、公众策略的选择;对公众参与监督的奖励大于监督成本时,是否参与监督取决于监督成本与地方政府补偿款大小的比较。可从督促地方政府履职尽责、制定合适的奖惩制度、完善公众监督渠道等方面促进矿山地质环境治理项目健康可持续发展。

In order to study the formation mechanism of interest conflicts of various subjects in the operation process of mining geological environment governance PPP project,the evolutionary game model of local government,enterprises and the public is constructed by game theory,and the income matrix is established.The model is solved and analyzed by using the principle of replicating dynamic equation and Lyaplov stability theory.The stable conditions are examined of each subject's strategy and the game system in this paper.A numerical simulation analysis of the game process is made by using matlab to explore the influence of the changes of parameters,such as the fine imposed by superior departments,on local governments,and the reward coefficient of local governments on enterprises and the compensation coefficient of the public on the subject's strategy selection.The results show that the decision of local government greatly affects the strategy choice of enterprises and the public.When the reward for public participation in supervision is greater than the supervision cost,the public participation decision in supervision depends on the comparison between the supervision cost and the local government compensation.According to the research results,the healthy and sustainable development of mining geological environment treatment projects could be promoted from the aspects of urging local governments to fulfill their duties,formulating appropriate reward and punishment systems,and improving public supervision channels.