政府干预下的创新联盟协同行为演化博弈分析——基于联盟分类视角

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Collaborative Behavior in Innovation Alliance under Government Intervention from the Perspective of Alliance Classification

创新联盟是整合互补性资源,开展协同攻关的重要平台。政府为促进联盟持续健康发展,关键在于把握好各项激励举措对联盟成员协同行为的潜在影响。鉴于此,本文基于国家农业科技创新联盟分类建设与管理实践,构建起了三个包含学研方、上游企业与下游企业的三方演化博弈模型,考虑了政府事前补助、事后成本补贴与事后奖励等潜在干预措施对产业性、专业性与区域性联盟内部协同生态的异质性影响,并对政府干预的激励效果进行仿真模拟。结果表明:中央政府采取额外的经费支持举措是必要的。其中,面向所有积极协同方的事后成本补贴是促进各联盟成员积极协同的关键举措;专业性联盟对此需求尤甚,产业性联盟次之,区域性联盟的需求最弱。此外,针对主导方较高强度的事前补助同样可激励产业性联盟各成员采取积极协同的行为策略。

Innovation alliance is an important platform for integrating complementary resources and carrying out collaborative research.In order to promote the sustainable and healthy development of the alliance,the key for the government is to grasp the potential impact of various incentive measures on the collaborative behavior of alliance members.In view of this,the classified construction and management practices of National Agricultural Science and Technology Innovation Alliance were considered.And the three tripartite evolutionary game models including research institutes,upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises were constructed.Specifically,the heterogeneous impact of potential interventions,such as government subsidies beforehand(GSB),government cost subsidies afterward(GSA)and government rewards afterward(GRA),on the collaborative ecosystem within industrial,professional or regional alliances was considered.In the end,the incentive effects of governmental interventions were simulated.It turns out that additional funding initiatives by central government are necessary.Furthermore,GSA for all active collaborators is the key to promote active collaboration among alliance members.And professional alliances have a strong demand for it,followed by industrial alliances and regional alliances.In addition,the higher intensity of GSB for the dominant party can also motivate the members of industrial alliances to collaborate actively.