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基于超模博弈的移动边缘计算边缘服务定价研究

Research on edge services pricing based on supermodular game in mobile edge computing
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摘要 在移动边缘计算中,计算和存储能力有限的移动用户向边缘服务提供商购买边缘服务来完成计算密集型任务,这依赖于一个边缘服务交易环境。目前,移动边缘计算领域中缺乏对边缘服务定价的研究,这影响边缘服务交易市场的繁荣以及移动边缘计算的快速发展。针对该问题,提出一种基于超模博弈的边缘服务定价方法。该方法首先考虑边缘服务提供商同行价格竞争和移动用户需求的影响,将边缘服务提供商之间的边缘服务定价过程建模成一个博弈模型。然后,基于超模博弈理论证明了该博弈模型存在纳什均衡,即存在最优定价。最后,设计一种梯度迭代更新算法求解该博弈模型的纳什均衡,为每个边缘服务提供商找到最优定价策略。仿真结果表明,所提方法能实现快速定价,并且边缘服务提供商的收益得到显著提升。 In mobile edge computing,mobile users with limited computing and storage capabilities purchase edge services from edge service providers to complete computation-intensive tasks,which relies on an edge service transaction environment.At present,there is a lack of research on edge services pricing in the field of mobile edge computing,which affects the prosperity of the edge service transaction market and the rapid development of mobile edge computing.For this problem,a method for edge services pricing based on supermodular game is proposed.This method first considers the influence of edge service providers′peer price competition and mobile user demand and models the edge service pricing process among edge service providers as a game model.Then,based on the supermodel game theory,it is proved that the game model has Nash equilibrium,that is,the existence of optimal pricing.According to the characteristics of the supermodel game,there is a Nash equilibrium in the game,that is,there is an optimal pricing for each edger service provider.Finally,a gradient iterative update algorithm is designed to solve the Nash equilibrium of the supermodel game to find the optimal pricing strategy for each edge service provider.The simulation results show that the proposed method can achieve fast pricing and significantly improve the profits of edge service providers.
作者 杨桂松 程浩 李俊 何杏宇 YANG Guisong;CHENG Hao;LI Jun;HE Xingyu(School of Optical-Electrical and Computer Engineering,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China;National Industrial Information Security Development Research Center,Beijing 100040,China;College of Communication and Art Design,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)
出处 《智能计算机与应用》 2023年第4期1-7,13,共8页 Intelligent Computer and Applications
基金 国家自然科学基金(61602305,61802257) 上海市自然科学基金项目(18ZR1426000,19ZR1477600)。
关键词 移动边缘计算 边缘服务定价 超模博弈 纳什均衡 梯度迭代更新算法 mobile edge computing edge services pricing supermodular game Nash equilibrium gradient iterative update algorithm
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