契约不完全、所有制差异与国内制造企业垂直并购机制

Incomplete Contract,Ownership Difference and the Mechanism of Vertical Mergers and Acquisitions of Chinese Manufacturers

微观视角探究国内制造企业垂直并购机制的文献尚不多见。鉴于此,本文在契约不完全理论的经典模型——GHM模型(Grossman和Hart,1986)基础上,首次构建了一个能够区分企业所有制结构差异并反映我国制造企业国内垂直并购行为的多阶段序贯生产理论分析框架,在此基础上,借助2004—2019年BVD-Zephyr全球并购交易分析库与CSMAR数据库的合并数据从微观层面进行实证检验。理论及实证结果均证实了契约不完全在解释与决定制造企业国内并购行为内在推动机理方面所起到的关键作用。此外,在替代型行业中,非国有制造业上市公司在国内并购进程中更倾向于一体化上游生产阶段,而在互补型行业中,非国有制造业上市公司在国内并购进程中则更倾向于一体化下游生产阶段。上述两种效应会伴随行业契约不完全水平的提高显著增强。

Literature that explores the mechanism of vertical MA in China from a micro perspective is relatively scant.In view of this,the paper extends the classical model of contract incompleteness—GHM model.We firstly build a multi-stage sequential production model which can distinguish the ownership structural difference and can reflect the vertical MA of Chinese manufacturing companies from the perspective of incomplete contracts.On this basis,with the merger of the BVD-Zephyr global MA transaction analysis database and the CSMAR database,we empirically test the above theory at the micro level.The empirical and theoretical results both evidence the central role played by contract incompleteness in determining and explaining the mechanism of internal promotion of domestic vertical mergers and acquisitions.Besides,we also find that in substitute industries,non-state-owned manufacturing listed companies more tend to integrate upstream production process during domestic MA,while in complementary industries,non-state-owned manufacturing listed companies more tend to integrate downstream production process during domestic MA.The above two effects will be significantly enhanced with the increase of the incompleteness of contracts.