控股股东股权质押与企业非效率投资——基于双重差分模型的检验

Equity Pledge of Controlling Shareholder and Inefficient Investment of Enterprises——A Test Based on DID Model

以我国A股上市公司2011—2019年的数据为样本,运用双重差分法探究控股股东股权质押与企业非效率投资之间的关系。经过实证分析发现:控股股东股权质押与企业非效率投资显著正相关,且主要表现为过度投资;随着质押比例的提高,控股股东股权质押对企业非效率投资的正向促进作用主要表现为过度投资;与国有企业相比,控股股东股权质押对企业非效率投资的正向作用在非国有企业中更加明显。希望此次实证能够进一步丰富股权质押与非效率投资之间的研究,为深入探究提供理论参考,以提高企业投资效率。

Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2011 to 2019,this paper explores the relationship between equity pledge of controlling shareholder and inefficient investment of enterprises by using Differences-in-Differences(DID).Through an empirical analysis,it is found that there is a significant positive correlation between them,mainly manifested as over-investment.With the increase of pledge ratio,controlling shareholder’s equity pledge has a positive effect on inefficient investment of enterprises with the main manifestation of over-investment.Compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises can see a more obvious positive effect of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on inefficient investment of enterprises.It is hoped that this empirical study can further enrich the research on equity pledge and inefficient investment,and provide theoretical reference for in-depth exploration,thus improving the investment efficiency of enterprises.