CEO声誉与企业内部控制质量

CEO Reputation and the Quality of Corporate Internal Control

CEO维护声誉的不同方式会导致企业内部控制质量发生不同变化。在有效契约假说下,为保证决策的有效执行,CEO会提高内部控制质量;在寻租假说下,为掩饰个人机会主义行为,CEO会降低内部控制质量。文章以2010—2021年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,考察CEO声誉与企业内部控制质量之间的关系,以检验上述两个竞争性假说。研究发现,CEO声誉与企业内部控制质量正相关,表明CEO倾向于做出有益于公司长期价值的决策以维护其声誉,支持了有效契约假说。异质性检验发现,当企业内外部风险较高、控股股东为国有股东或机构股东以及控股股东控制权较大时,CEO声誉与企业内部控制质量之间的正向关系更为明显,表明在企业内外部风险较高以及内外部监督作用较强时,CEO通过提升公司长期价值维护其声誉的可能性更高。文章结论丰富了CEO声誉理论研究,为经理人市场的治理作用提供了经验证据。

Different ways for CEO to maintain reputation make variations of the quality of corporate internal control.The efficient contracting hypothesis predicts that CEO will improve the quality of internal control to ensure the effective implementation of decisions.In contrast,the rent extraction hypothesis predicts that CEO will reduce the quality of internal control to cover up their opportunistic behaviors.Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2021 as research samples,this paper examines the relationship between CEO's reputation and enterprise internal control quality,so as to test the above two competitive hypotheses.It is found that CEO's reputation is positively correlated with the quality of internal control,indicating that CEO tends to make decisions conducive to the long-term value of the company to maintain their reputation.The conclusion ultimately supports the efficient contracting hypothesis.The heterogeneity test finds that when the internal and external risk of the enterprise is high,the controlling shareholder is state-owned or institutional shareholder and the control right is large,the positive relationship between the CEO's reputation and the internal control quality of the enterprise is more pronounced,indicating that when the internal and external risk of the enterprise is high and the internal and external supervision function is strong,CEO is more likely to defend his reputations by enhancing the long-term value of the companies.The conclusion of this paper enriches the theoretical research on CEO reputation and provides empirical evidences for the governance role of manager market.