基于三方博弈的事故多发点段治理机制研究

事故多发点段治理工作机制的主要参与方为地方人民政府、交通运输管理部门和公安交通管理部门,研究发现当前事故多发点段的治理机制已无法满足和适应当前交通安全治理所涉及的各部门的工作需要,如何统筹平衡事故多发点段治理工作中上述三方的工作资源并做好协调配合是当前诸多省市重点关注的实际问题。因此本文从浙江省交通安全工作实际需求出发,借助博弈论工具对事故多发点段治理工作所涉及的主要部门之间的自然演化过程进行了推演分析,得出未经优化的事故多发点段治理机制下的三方自然演进结果无法达到帕累托最优且存在优化改进理论可能的博弈分析结论。论文基于三方演化博弈的研究成果,结合调研采集的工作实际,提出了一系列可落地性较强的优化建议和改进策略。

The main participants of the accident-prone section treatment mechanism are local people's governments,transport management departments and public security traffic management departments.The research finds that the current treatment mechanism for accident-prone sections can no longer meet and adapt to the work needs of various departments involved in current traffic safety management.How to coordinate and balance the work resources of the above mentioned parties in the treatment of accident-prone sections and make them cooperate well are practical concerns of many provinces and cities.Therefore,based on the actual needs of traffic safety work in Zhejiang province,this paper uses game theory tools to deduce and analyze the natural evolution process among the main departments involved in the treatment of accident-prone sections and draws a game analysis conclusion that the natural evolution result of the three parties under the unoptimized treatment mechanism for accident-prone sections cannot reach Pareto optimality and there is theoretical possibility of optimization improvement.Based on the research results of evolutionary game among three parties and combined with information collected through surveys,this paper puts forward a series of feasible optimization suggestions and improvement strategies.